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ABSTRAC'f 
A probability forecaster is asked to give a density p of a random 
variable w. In return he gets a reward (or score} depending on p 
and on a subsequently observed value of· w. A scoring rule is called 
proper if the expected score is maximized when the true density is 
chosen. The present paper uses convex analysis to generalize McCarthy's 
characterization of proper scoring rules. 
1aesearch supported by NSF Grant GP-9556. 
i' • 
-. 
-
1. Introduction and Summary. Let (n, a,µ} be a measure space 
and let P be a convex class of probability densities with respect to 
the measure µ. A scoring rule f is a mapping from P into the class 
t of random variables on n. Assume a forecaster has kn~ledge of a 
probability density pc P, and is to receive the· score (or actual 
payment) f(p) for his disclosure of p. Since f(p) is a random variable, 
the score depends on the outcome of the experiment wen. The score f 
has been called proper if 
(1) E ( f ( p) ) > E ( f ( q)) for all p, q E: P p - p 
where E (•) is the mathematical expectation with respect to the density p 
p. If (1) holds, then the forecaster will maximize his expected score 
with respect to p by disclosing this density p. To avoid difficulties 
in (1) we will assume E (f( q)) exists and is finite. p 
The first suggested use of a scoring rule was apparently by Brier 
(1950) in connection with weather forecasting. The independent work of 
Good (1952) explicitly considered condition (1). For more recent work, see 
for example de Finetti (1962), Winkler (1969), Savage (1970), and Stael von 
Holstein (1970). The latter notes that scoring rules have also been called 
payoff or reward or incentive functions, and gives an excellent bibliography 
listing 133 items. 
While the above context in which p is known to the forecaster is 
adequate for our purposes, other points of view are possible. For example 
the cumulative score of any forecaster may be used as a measure of his 
forecasting ability; or the stated p may be regarded as defining a 
subjective probability. But the present paper is concerned only with the 
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purely mathematical problems connected with the characterization of functions 
f satisfying (1) (or strictly satisfying (1)). Our ma.in result is 
Theorem 3.1, which modifies and generalizes a theorem of McCarthy (1956), 
using a generalization of Rockaf~llar's (1970) definition of subgradient. 
Theorems 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 give additional conditions to ensure that 
there exists an f satisfying the requirements of Theorem 3.1. The 
necessary preliminary definitions and theorems are given in Section 2. 
2. Some Concepts.- of Convex Analysis.· The space t of random 
variables on (n, a) is a vector space with an inner product defined 
whenever it exists by 
(2) p•q = f p{w)q(w)dµ(w). 
Let t 1 = t 1(P) be the set of all q e £ such that p•q is defined 'for 
all p e P. The range of a scoring rule f defined on P is assumed to 
i 
be contained in c;(P). The following relation is crucial for applyi~g 
convex analysis to studying (1): 
(3) E (q) = p•q p if p e P • 
For given f, the expected score H is defined on P by 
(4) H(p) = p•f(p) 
and condition (1) is equivalent to 
(5) H(p) ~ p•f(q) for all p, q e P. 
The condition that f be strictly proper is 
(6) H(p) > p•f(q) if p /: q. 
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The following is a generalization of Rockafellar's (1970) definition 
of subgradient to the infinite-dimensional case: 
Definition 2.1. If H is defined on a convex set D ct and if there 
* exists q e D and q e !i,(D) such that 
(7) * H(p) ~ (p-q)•q + H(q) for all p e D 
* then q is a subgradient of H at q (relative to D}. 
It can be shown in the Euclidean case that a subgradient of a convex 
function H is unique and equal to the gradient at every point where H 
is a differentiable (Rockafellar, (1970) Theorem 25.1). 
* Theorem 2. 1. If H has a subgradient q at each point q in a 
convex set D, then H is convex on D. 
* Proof: For any p, q e D, let pl be a subgradient of H at 
* * pl= (1-k)p + kq. Then H(p) ~ (p-p1)•pl + U(p1 ) and H(q) ~ (q-p1)•p1 + H(p1). 
It follows that (1-A)ll(p) + kH(q) ~ H(p1). 
The following is a variant of Euler's theorem. 
Theorem 2.2. If H is homogeneous ot degree r on a convex cone D 
* * and has a subgradient q e ~{D) for some q e D, then rH(q) = q•q. 
r * Proof: The inequality k H(q) = H(Aq) ~ (Aq - q)•q + H(q) implies 
r * A - ~ H(q) ~ q•q if A> 1, 
* with the reverse inequality if O <A< 1. Thus rH(q) = q•q. 
It can be shown further that ·if * q is a subgradient at q of H 
in Theorem 2.2, then 
all A> O. 
( )* r-1 * Aq = A q is a subgradient of H at Aq for 
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In the sequel we will use the term "homogeneous" to mean "homogeneous 
of the first degree." If H is homogeneous on a convex set C, then by 
letting H(Ap) = >-..H(p) we can always extend the domain of H to the 
convex cone D = {>-..p: p e C, >-.. > O}. 
3. McCarthy's Theorem. McCarthy (1956) stated without proof a 
characterization of proper scoring rules for the case when P is the class 
of discrete distributions on a finite set n. Our Theorem 3.1 applies to 
more general P and distinguishes between strict and non-strict inequalities. 
Theorem 3.1. A scoring rule f mapping P into t 1 satisfies (1) 
[strictly] iff there exists a function H defined on D = (>-..p: p e P, A> OJ 
which is {a) homogeneous, (b) convex [strictly convex on P], and (c) such 
that f(p) is a subgradient of H relative to D at p for all p e P. 
The function H satisfies H(>-..p) = Ap•f(p). 
Proof: Assuming (1) holds, define· H(Ap) = >-..p•f(p). Using (1) 
H(Ap) ~ >-..p•f(q) z (AP - q)•f(q) + H(q) 
for all p, q e P, A> O, which establishes {c). Finally {b) follows from 
Theorem 2.1. 
Conversely, (a, b, c) imply by Theorem 2.2 that H(Ap) = >-..p•f(p), 
and substituting this into the subgradient inequality gives the desired 
result (l). 
Strict inequality in (1) is equivalent to no subgradient of H at 
p being a subgradient of H at q, if p, q e P, p J q. This is 
equivalent to H being strictly convex on P. 
Example 3.1. A familiar example is the logarithmic score suggested 
by Good (1952) for the binomial case. In the general case we put 
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(8) f(p) = ln p • 
A well known inequality shows that f is strictly proper. If µ 
is finite, then H(Ap) = Ap•f(p) is finite for ~pc t 2+ where 
~+ = {q: q(w) ~ 0 for all wen, J q2 dµ < mJ, and H is continuous 
with respect to the ~ norm 11•11 defined by the inner product (2). 
In the finite discrete case let the density p(w) be replaced by 
a vector p of probabilities pj. For this per, H(p) = E p.ln p., 
J J 
but for q = AP e D, H(q) = A E pjln pj = E qjln(qj/E qk). Marschak 
(1960), p. 97, attempted to show that the logarithmic score gave a 
counterexample to McCa~thy's theorem,erroneously considering the gradient 
of E p ln p j I rather than of E qjln{qj/E qk). A proper understanding 
of the theorem requires a clear distinction between P and D not 
explicitly stated in McCarthy's paper. 
If we wish to define f on D as well as on P, then a natural 
choice is f(Ap) = f(p). In particular for the logarithmic case 
f(q) = ln{q/f qdµ). Unlike ln q, this f(q) is a subgradient of H for 
all q e D. 
Example 3.2. For Pc .£2(µ), the "quadratic" score f(p) = 2p - IIPll 2 
(Brier (1950), de Finetti (1962)) is strictly proper. H(Ap) = A\IPll2 • 
Example 3.3. For Pc t 2(µ), the "spherical" score f(p) = p/llPII is 
strictly proper. H(~p) = Allplf. 
4. Expected Score Functions. It might be asked what class of homogeneous 
and convex functions on D satisfy the additional requirement of Theorem 
3.1 of having subgradients relative to D at each point in P. The 
following is an example of a function which has no subgradients and yet is 
homogeneous and convex. 
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Example 4.1. Let P be the class of continuous, bounded densities 
(sup p(w) < m) on (R, a,~) where µ is Lebesgue measure and ~ 
w 
consists of the Borel sets. Define H(p) = sup p(w). Then H is clearly 
w 
convex on P. However, H is neither continuous at any p e P (with 
respect to IIPII) nor does H have a subgradient for any p e P. 
Let He t be a Hilbert •pace, R the real numbers, and let H x R 
have the usual product topology and inner product. H can be taken to be 
the smallest closed subspace of ~(µ) cdntaining P, where Pc~(µ). 
If D c H is the convex domain of a real-valued function H, then the 
epigraph of H, epi (H) c H x R, is these~ {(p, a) : a?;: H(p), p e D). 
H is a convex function iff epi (H) is a convex set. 
The following is a partial converse to Theorem 2.1. 
Theorem 4.1. Let D be a convex set in H whose interior is 
nonempty. Let H be a convex function on D which is continuous at a 
point p e int (D). 
q e int (D). 
* Then H has a subgradient q e H at each point 
Proof: The assumptions imply epi (H) i$ a convex subset of the 
Hilbert space H x R whose interior is nonempty. If this is satisfied 
then epi (H) has a closed hyperplane of support through each of its 
boundary points. (See for example Valentine (1964) Theorems 2.15 and 4.1.) 
The supporting hyperplane at the boundary point (q, H(q)) is seen 
* to give one of the following inequalities for some q e H: 
(9) * H(p)?;: (p-q) • q + H(q) for all p e D, 
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(10) * * q•q ~ p•q for all pc D. 
Clearly, (10) is satisfied o~ly if q e bdry(D). Hence (9) is satisfied 
if q e int(D). 
Theorem 4.2. !f the set of densities D c M is a convex set and if 
H is convex and homogeneous on D and continuous at a point p in the 
interior of D, then there exists f such·that conditions (4) and (5) 
hold on the interior of D. The range of f may be taken in M. 
Proof: Whenever pt int{D), apply Theorem 4.1 and let f(p) be 
a subgradient of H at p. The proof follows from Theorem 2.2. 
The following theorems give equivalent conditions on f for 
continuity conditions on H. We assume the range of f is in :ti. 
Theorem 4.3. If D is a convex cone in ~ whose interior is 
nonempty and lf H and f satisfy (4) and (5) on D, then H is continuous 
at p e int(D) iff there exists a neighborhood of p on which !lf(•)II 
is bounded. 
Proof: Let p, p e D, IIP - PII ... 0 as n - eo. Let q = f(p )/jlf(p )11 2 • 
n n n n n 
Then H(p + q) > (p + q )•f(p) = H(p) + 1. Thus, if H i.s continuous 
nn-nn n n 
at p, we cannot have llqnJI ... 0. Hence !If(• )I) is bounded on a neighborhood 
of p. 
Conversely, if llf(,)11 is bounded on a neighborhood of p then by 
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (p - p) •f(p ) ... 0 if !IP - Pl! ... 0. This 
n n n 
implies lim H(p ) = lim p,f(p ) < H(p). Also lim H(p ) > limp •f(p) = H(p). 
n n- - n- n 
Hence, if jjp - Pll ... 0 then H(p ) _. H(p). 
n n 
We will now assume that f is defined on the convex cone D such 
that 
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(11) f(>-..p) = f(p) if p CD,>-..> O. 
This condition, although natural, is not necessary because the homogeneous 
function H may have several subgradients at any pc D. 
Corollary 4.1. If f and H satisfy (4), (5), and {11) on a convex 
cone D c ){ then H is continuous on the interior of D iff llf{•)II 
is bounded on every closed set contained in D. 
Proof: Since f(~p} = f(p) if >-.. > O, llf( •)11 is bounded on evet·y 
closed set contained in D is equivalent to JI£(• )JI bounded on every 
compact set in D, which is equivalent to the requirement of Theorem 4.3 
that lff( •)11 be locally bounded at each point p e int{D). 
Theorem 4.4. If H and f satisfy conditions (4), (5), and (11) 
for all points in a Hilbert space J:l, then the following are equivalent: 
(1) H is continuous; 
(ii) H . is bounded on the sphere (p e lt : IIPII = l); 
( iii) II £11 is bounded • 
Proof: We need only show ( ii) implies (iii). This follows from 
H(f(q)/llf(q)II)~ (f(q)/llf(q)ll)•f{q) = llf(q)fl. 
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DETERMINING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
BY SEQUENTIAL CHOICES1 
by 
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ABSTRACT 
Let A denote an uncertain outcome whose subjective 
probability is to be determined. A scheme is described 
wherein the subject is offered a sequence of choices 
of prospects. At step n, a value r (o < r < 1) is 
determined by previous responses, and Prospect A is 
a reward of g{r) if A occurs, while Prospect B 
is a reward of g{r) if B occurs, where B has 
r r 
known probability r. A characterization is given of 
those rewards which encourage honest responses. The 
results are related to the method of "score" or "payoff" 
functions for determining subjective probabilities. 
~esearch supported by National Science Foundation Grant GP-9556. 
--
1. Introduction. 
Definitions of subjective probability may be given in terms of 
preferences or choices. For example, in the translation by Kyburg and 
Smokler [11, p. 57] of Borel [2] we find: 
Paul claims that it will rain tomorrow; I agree that 
we are in accord on the precise meaning of this claim and 
I offer him the choice of receiving 100 francs if he is 
correct or 100 francs if he receives a 5 or a 6 in a 
throw of dice. In the second case the probability of receiving 
100 francs is one third; if he then prefers to receive 100 
francs if his meteorological prediction is correct, it is 
because he attributes to this prediction a probability 
superior to one third. The same method can be applied to 
all verifiable judgements; it allows a numerical evaluation 
of probabilities with a precision quite comparable to that 
with which one evaluates prices. 
A similar example involving probabilities that eggs are good is given 
by Savage [14, p. 28]. 
In Borel's example the subject's choice fails to determine a unique 
value of the subjective probability of rain but tells us only whether 
it belongs to the interval O ~ p ~ ½ or to the interval ½ ~ p ~ 1. 
The present paper is concerned with procedures which determine subjective 
probabilities uniquely or else to a preassigned accuracy. Two ways of 
doing this a~e considered. The first is to present ~he subject with a 
choice of more than two alternatives. In Section 2 we show the relation-
ship between this approach and the method of "score" or "payoff" functions. 
The sec-:...hJ method is simply to repeat the binary choices of Borel's 
example sequentially with the prospects at each stage deterndned by 
previous choices. In Section 3 we show that the rewards in such sequential 
methods lmlSt be chosen with care for otherwise a dishonest answer may 
actually be advantageous to the subject. For a particular sequential 
scheme we characterize the rewards which "encourage honesty." In 
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Section 4 we consider how it is possible to modify the procedures so as 
to avoid any assumptions (such as linearity) of the subject's utility 
function. 
2. Choices and Score Functions. 
The main ideas of this section have evolved through the work of 
de Finetti, Savage, and others (as indicated). We give the essentials 
as background for Section 3. For a more detailed account, see Savage 
[ 15]. 
Let R be any uncertain but verifiable outcome, such as "rain 
tomorrow," and let p denote a subjective value of P(R). Let Prospect A 
be a reward of one dollar if A occurs (and nothing otherwise) and 
let Prospect B be a reward of one dollar if H occurs (H = heads on 
the toss of a coin) and nothing otherwise. We take it to be axiomatic 
that P(H) ~ p ~ 1 if Prospect A is chosen and O ~ p ~ P(H) if 
1 Prospect B is chosen. If we agree that P(H) = 2 and if the subject 
has a linear utility function (as we shall assume throughout Sections 
2 and 3), then Prospect Bis equivalent to a reward of $0.50 whether or 
not A occurs. This suggests a more general procedure in which a subject 
may choose one of n prospects A1, A2 , ••• , An, where Aj is a reward 
of if R fails to occur or a reward of if R occurs. 
If we p~esume that the subject makes that choice which maximizes his 
utility, calculated using his subjective probability p, then the choice 
Ai implies that p satisfies 
(2.1) 
Thus when {a., b.) are suitably chosen, p is known to lie in one of 
J J 
- 2 -
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n intervals; and by increasing the number n of prospects we may determine 
p to any required accuracy. 
The function Hn(p) = supj(aj + bjp) is convex and piecewise linear. 
For a continuous analog of the case of finite n, let H (p) 
n 
be replaced 
by any strictly convex H(p) having a unique supporting straight line 
L ,(p), tangent to H at (p', H(p')), for each O ~ p' ~ 1. If a,= L ,(o), p p p 
a 1 + b 1 = L ,(1), then L ,(p) = a 1 + b 1p. The subject may p p p p p p 
be given a continuous choice of prospects: for any chosen value 
0 ~ p 1 ~ 1 
R occurs. 
he receives 
The choice 
a I p 
p' 
if R fails to occur or a,+ b, if p p 
has utility L ,(p), and from the strict p 
convexity of H it is easily sean that 
(2.2) H(p) = L {p) > L ,(p) for all p, p 1 , p - p 
with equality only when p' = p. Since utility is maximized by the 
choice p' = p, it seems reasonable to define the individual's subjective 
probability to be the chosen value p'. This definition has in fact 
been proposed and studied by Savage (15, Sec. 8]. 
Occasionally it may be of interest to consider functions H(p) 
which have linear segments {that is "flat spots," so that H is not 
strictly convex}, or "corners," where there is more than one line of 
support~ In the latter case we may agree that there are different choices 
all of which define the same value of the subjective probability, namely 
the abscissa of the corner. In the former case, a choice will correspond 
to a straight line supporting H over a range of values, and we will 
say that the subjective probability by definition belongs to that range. 
This in fact is the case which is considered in Section 3 below. 
- 3 -
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The case of a vector (p1 , ••• , pk) of probabilities corresponding 
to k disjoint and exhaustive outcomes R1 , ••• , ¾ can be treated 
similarly. In general we may wish to consider a "payoff" or "score" 
function fj(p') such that the subject receives fj(p') when p' is 
his stated probability vector and outcome R. occurs. The utility to 
J 
the subject of stating the vector p' is Epjf/p'). The score function 
has been called proper if 
(2.3) 
If equality holds only when p = p', then. fj(p) is called strictly 
proper, and a stated p' can be defined to be the subjective probability 
vector. 
Score functions were first proposed by Brier [5] and independently 
by Good [7], who introduced condition (2.3). For more recent work, see 
for example (1, 6, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22]. Actual experimental results 
will be found in (18] and (20). A characterization of proper scores 
given by McCarthy [12) has been generalized by Hendrickson and Buehler 
(10]. 
3. Determining Subjective Probabilities by Sequential Choices. 
In this section we will consider a number of sequential procedures 
for determining subjective probability. The subject is offered a sequence 
of choices with the prospects at each stage depending on previous choices. 
First we will indicate a number of difficulties, and then we will describe 
a satisfactory procedure. 
3.1 A procedure suggested by Borel. 
In Borel [4; Chapter 3, sec. 9], we find an extension of the idea 
mentioned in Section 1 above: 
- 4 -
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The method of auction sale often clarifies a buyer's ex~ct 
evaluation of the worth of an object or a building offered for 
sale, for he stops bidding when the limit he has set himself 
has been reached. A similar method may be used, if Peter will 
accept it, to compel Peter to reveal precisely his evaluation 
of a certain probability. Let us return to the case where 
Peter is a consultant doctor who has been able to evaluate a 
patient's chances of recovery. We propose to find out whether 
he evaluates these chances at more than 50 per cent. We choose 
a contingent event with an exact 50 per cent probability, such 
as the game of heads or tails and we offer Peter an important 
gift or an intangible reward of considerable value to him and 
give him the choice between the following two eventualities: 
either he will receive the gift if the patient recovers, or he 
will receive the gift if a tossed coin turns up tails. He is 
clearly interested in choosing the eventuality with the higher 
probability in his opinion. He-will choose the recovery of the 
patient if he considers the probability of this recovery to be 
above 50 per cent. If, on the contrary, he chooses the game of 
heads or tails, that will prove to us that he evaluates the 
probability of the recovery at less than 50 per cent. We may 
then repeat the test, using an eventuality with_a 49 per cent 
probability. We may, for instance, with several decks of cards, 
whose backs are similar, make up a pack of 100 cards, 49 of 
which are red and 51 black. The probability of.extracting a 
red card from this pack spread on the table after shuffling is 
49 per cent or o.49. If Peter prefers this probability to that 
of the case of recovery, it is because he evaluates the latter 
at less than o.49. We may continue until Peter chooses the 
probability of the recovery when the other probability is only 
o.43, whereas he had preferred the probability o.44. We shall 
conclude that his true evaluation of the probability of the 
recovery is between o.43 and o.44. But, of course, true 
evaluation does not mean exact evaluation, since Peter is not 
infallible. Even if he is very skillful, it is quite doubtful 
that he can distinguish with certainty between probabilities as 
close together as o.43 and o.44. That is why it would be futile 
to seek a more exact decimal by diminishing the successive 
probabilities by a thousandth instead of a hundredth. 
In ~ctual practice it is relevant to know whether Peter is apprised 
of the rules of the questioning scheme. If he is not, then the possibility 
that he may guess the rules confuses the picture. Therefore we suppose 
the rules are spelled out in advance. To formalize Borel's suggested 
procedure, we will attach a utility to each prize, putting g(q) equal 
to the utility value when the outcome of known probability has probability 
- 5 -
q. Let A, B denote respectively the choice by Peter of the prospect 
involving the patient's recovery and that involving the outcone having 
known probability. Our understanding of the procedure is that the 
response sequence will have either the form BBB ••• BA or AAA ••• AB, 
where for example the response BBBBBBBA implies that the probability 
of recovery lies between o.43 and o.44. If we let p denote Peter's 
subjective value of the probability of recovery, then with the assumption 
of a linear utility function we find, for example: 
Response "Honest range" Utility 
AAB 0.51 ~ p ~ 0.52 UAAB(p) = pg(.50) + pg(.51) + 0.52g(.52) 
AB 0.50 ~ p ~ 0.51 uAB(p) = pg(.50) + o.51g(.51) 
BA o.49 ~ p ~ 0.50 UBA(p) = 0.50g(.50) + pg(.49) 
BBA o.48 ~ p ~ o.49 u8BA(p) = o.5og(.50) + o.49g(.49) + pg(.48) 
Here the "honest range" is the interval of p values which presumably 
contains the actual subjective value when the corresponding response is 
given. In accordance with the discussion in Section 2 above, this will 
be the case if and only if the response maximizes the utility over that 
range. But this is not the case. For example UAAB(p} = UA8 (p) should 
imply p = 0.51, but in fact implies p = 0.51 - o.52g(.52)/g(.51). Thus 
there is no (non-zero} choice of prizes g(q) such that each response 
maximize;:s the utility over each appropriate "honest range." The essential 
reason for this is simply that in many cases it is more profitable for 
Peter to prolong the sequence, in order to obtain more prospects of 
prizes, than to give an "honest" answer. 
- 6 -
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3.2 An alternative procedure. 
In view of the difficulties with the preceding method, we will now 
describe an alternative procedure. The present section will give the 
rules, and the following sections the p_roperties. 
Let A denote an uncertain outcome and let p denote the subjective 
value of P(A). Let Br denote an outcome having known probability r. 
The subject is offered a sequence of choices of prospects. At any step, 
Prospect A is a payoff of a positive amount. g(r) if A occurs and 
Prospect B is a payoff of g(r) if B occurs. It remains to describe 
r 
the sequence (r) 
n 
of r-values and to choose g(r). This is to be done 
in such a way that "honest" answers maximize the utility to the subject. 
Consider the following particular choice. At Step 
At Step 2, r = 1 3 r2 = 1; or 1; 
chosen at Step 1. Similarly 
preceding choice was B or 
according as Prospect B 
at Step n, r = 
r = r 1+ 2 n n-
-n 
r = r n-1-n 
if it was 
1, 1 r = rl = 2 • 
or A was 
2 -n if the 
A. The idea, 
of course, is to obtain a sequence of r-values converging to p. 
3.3 Honest and dishonest choices. 
if 
At any step n we will say the choice of A is honest if and only 
p > r, and the choice B 
- n 
is honest if and only if P < r • 
- n 
To 
see why some choices of g(r) may encourage dishonest choices, consider 
the foll.owing example. Suppose the procedure is to be carried to only 
two steps, and suppose we make the fairly natural choice of a unit 
payoff in each case, that is, g{r) = 1 for r = 1/2, 1/4, 3/4. Then 
the choices AA, AB, BA, BB have respectively the utilities 2p, 
p + 3/4, p + 12 and 3/4. Therefore the response AB is advantageous 
for all O ~ p ~ 3/4 rather than only for 1/2 ~ p ~ 3/4. If p = l/3, 
- 7 -
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say, a slight loss arising from a '.'dishonest" answer (A) at Step 1 is 
more than compensated for by a guaranteed utility of 3/4 at Step 2. 
Similarly another fairly natural choice of payoffs would be 
g(r) = 1/r, so that Prospect B has utility equal to uriity on each 
occasion. This choice also provokes dishonest responses since with 
p = 2/3 we find BA has utili~y 11/3 while the "honest" AB has 
utility 7/3. 
3.4 Characterization of payoffs which encourage honest responses. 
Consider the case n = 2. We have: 
Response "Honest range" Utility 
BB 0::: p ~ 1/4 (1/2)g(l/2) + (1/4)g(l/4) 
BA 1/4::: p ~ 1/2 (l/2)g(l/2) + pg(l/4) 
AB 1/2 ~ p ~ 3/4 pg(l/2) + (3/4)g(3/4) 
AA 3/4 ::: p ~ 1 pg(l/2) + pg(l/4) 
We will say that the scheme is "strictly proper" {meaning that it 
encourages honest answers) if and only if each utility is maximum over 
the indicated "honest range," with ties occurring only at the boundary 
points between ranges. (In accordance with the terminology for score 
functions used in Section 2, the scheme would be called "proper" if ties 
were allowed over a range of values.) Since the utilities are all linear 
functions of p, the scheme will be strictly proper if and only if: (i) 
the slopes form a strictly increasing sequence in the order listed, and 
(ii) neighboring lines {those whose "honest ranges" meet} must intersect 
at the colJDilOn value of p. 
Condition (i) holds automatically at p = 1/4 and 3/4, and at 
p = 1/2 gives 
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(3.1) g(l/2) > g(l/4). 
Condition (ii) is also automatic at p = 1/4 and 3/4, and at p = 1/2 
we get 
(3.2) g(3/4) = (2/3)g(l/4). 
Similar analysis for n = 3 yields the following: From condition 
(ii) for p = 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 we get 
(3.3) g(7/8) = (6/7)g(5/8), g(5/8) = (4/5)g(3/8), g(3/8) = (2/3)g(l/8) 
and from condition (i): 
(3.4) g(3/4) > g(5/8) 
(3.5) g(l/2) > g(l/4) + g(3/8) 
(3.6) g(l/4) > g(l/8). 
If we define 
(3.7) for k = 3,5,7, ••• , 
then (3.3) can be written as 
(3.8) g{k/8) = k; 1 g({k-2)/8) = h(k)g(l/8), k = 3,5,7. 
If in (3.4) we substitute from (3.2) and (3.8), we get g(l/4) ~ {4/5)g(l/8), 
which is implied by (3.6). Also (3.1) is implied by (3.5). Thus 
necessary and sufficient conditions for g(r) to be proper for n = 1,2,3 
are the equalities (3.2), (3.8) and the inequalities (3.5), (3.6). 
We will now give necessary and sufficient conditions for the payoffs 
g{r) to give a strictly proper scheme for all values of n from 1 to N. 
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Condition (ii) is satisfied automatically.at odd-numbered common values 
-n 
of p (p = 2 s, s odd). At even-numbered points, (ii) gives 
(3.9) g(2-°k) = k; 1 g(2-n(k-2)) = h(k)g(2-n), k = 3,5,7, ••. , 2n-l. 
Let (n) n a , s = 1,2, ••• , 2, denote the slope of the utility of the 
s 
response which is honest at time n for the range 2-n(s-1) ~ p :5 2-ns. 
Condition (i) can be written 
(3.10) 13(n)>a(n) 
s+l s 
for s n = 1,2, ••• , 2 -1 and n = 1,2, ••• , N. For odd s, ( 3.10) is 
satisfied automatically since the difference is 
(3.11) 
which is assumed to be positive. For s = 2,4, ••• , 2n-2, define k and 
m by 
(3.12) 
Th i k/2m 1 at s, equa s s /2n reduced to lowest terms. Then the difference 
of slopes in (3.10) can be shown to be 
(3.13) a{n) - 13{n) = g(2-~) - n~m g(2-m-j(2jk-1)). 
s+l s j=l 
Thus if (3.9) holds then (3.10) is equivalent to 
(3.14) 
for k = 1,3, ••• , m 2 -1, m = 1,2, ••• , n, and n = 1,2, ••• , N. There are 
many redundancies in (3.14). The inequalities in which n = N imply 
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all others. Indeed, as we show.1.in the Appendix, the inequalities in 
which k = 1 imply all others. 
SuUDDing up, we assert that the payoffs g(r) give a strictly 
proper scheme for n = 1,2, ••• , N if and only if (3.9) and (3.14), 
where (3.14) need hold only for k = 1, n = N and N m = 1,2, ••• , 2 -1. 
The conditions on g(2-m) for m = 1,2, ••• , N in (3.14) are equivalent 
to the conditions given by the system of inequalities 
00 
(3.16) g(2-n) > E h(2j-l}g(2-n-j) 
j=l 
( -N-1) ( -N-2 where g 2 , g 2 }, ••• are arbitrary positive terms. Equation 
(3.16) holds for all n if and only if condition (ii) holds for all n. 
To find a payoff schedule g(r) meeting our requirements, we 
first note that 
(3.17) 
will imply (3.16) for all n. Thus we get a strictly proper scoring 
rule by taking for example ( -n) -n g 2 = 2 
values of g uniquely defined by (3.9). 
3.5 The limit as n tends to infinity. 
for n = 1,2, ••• , with other 
We will now show that if the payoffs g(r} satisfy (3.9) and (3.16) 
for eve·7 n, then they yield a strictly proper scoring rule in the limit 
as n tends to infinity. Let x, y be any fixed points, 0 < x < y < 1. 
We can find m, k so that k is odd and x ~ 2-11\c < y. Letting a(m)cz.) 
denote the slope at step m at point z, we have a<m)(x) ~ aim) and 
a{m)(y) 2: ai:i. Thus by (3.11), a(m)(y) - a(m)(x) 2: g(2-1\:). If we 
go to n = m + m' steps, then a(n)(x) < a<n) and a<n)(y) > a<n~ where 
- t - t+l 
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m' t = 2 k. By (3.13) we·have 
(3.18) ~(n)(y) _ ~(n)(x) > ~(n) ~~n) 
- t+l ~ 
m' . 
= g(2-~) - 'E g(2-m-j(2Jk-l)) 
j=l 
m' 
= h(k)g(2-m) - 'E h(2jk-l)g(2-m-j). 
j=l 
Consider the limit of the last expression as m' (or n) tends to infinity. 
When k = 1 the limit is strictly positive whenever the strict inequalities 
(3.16) hold. When k = 3, 5, ••• , the limit is again strictly positive 
by the monotone property of h(2jk-1)/h(k) proved in the Appendix. There-
fore we conclude that in the limit, the scoring rule is strictly proper. 
Further100re, if we let x and y approach 2-11\c from below and above, 
we see incidentally that the limit function is not differentiable at any 
of the points 2-11\c. 
Sequential schemes in which the score functions are strictly proper 
only at the finite stages n = N (not necessarily proper for n < N) 
or only in the limit have been characterized by Hendrickson [9] by systems 
of equations and inequalities which relax the conditions (3.9) and (3.16). 
4. Avoiding Assumptions about Utility Functions. 
The analysis of Sections 2 and 3 is valid when the subject's utility 
is a li1.lear function of the prizes or scores. There are several ways 
in which the procedures can be modified to avoid this assumption. One 
way is simply to use lottery tickets as rewards. This method applies 
to the procedures of Section 2 for any score function which is bounded. 
We simply transform the scores by a linear function of positive slope 
such that the transformed values lie in the interval (o, 1). The 
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subject is awarded lottery tickets such that his chance of winning the 
lottery equals the transformed score. The payoffs described iri Section 3 
will in general be bounded in total a100unt for any number of steps, so 
that they may also be replaced by parcels of lottery tickets for a single 
lottery. Techniques of this kind have been suggested previously by 
Savage (14] and Smith (17, Sec. 13]. 
It is also possible to employ auxiliary randomization at other 
points in the procedure to avoid assumptions about utilities. Here is 
an example. Let A be an outcome whose subjective probability p is 
to be determined, and let two independent auxiliary trials have outcomes 
B, B (where i = complement of B) and C, C whose probabilities b = P(B) 
and c = P(C) can be chosen. Let the payoff to the subject be one dollar 
if either AB or BC occurs, and nothing otherwise. The expectation 
is then c(l-b) + hp (measured in utiles if the utility of one dollar is 
one utile). The values c and b can be chosen to depend on a stated 
value, say p', of P(A), as we have done above in Section 2. For example, 
if b = b{p') = p'/2 and c = c(p') = (2-p 12)/(4-2p'), then 
(4.1) c(l-b) +hp= (1/4)(2 + p2 - (p-p 1 ) 2 ), 
which for any p is maximized by putting p' = p. Therefore the procedure 
is proper in the sense of Section 2, and avoids utilities since there 
is only a single prize of one dollar involved. 
Proper sequential procedures for determining the subjective probability 
of an event A also can be made utility free by using any fixed single 
prize, say two utiles, and by employing independent random events. Unlike 
the procedure of Section 3, a single payoff is given only at time N 
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where N is a random variable whose value is independently determined 
after the sequence of choices has been made. The single payoff may 
be considered an advantage. 
Let H have probability 1/2. At any step let Prospect A be a 
payoff of two utiles if either AH or iii occurs, and let Prospect B 
r 
be a payoff of two utiles if either B H or AH occurs. 
r 
Here the 
sequence of r values id defined just as in Section 3.2, and B again 
r 
has probability r. 
Let p be the subjective probability of A, and let q = lim r • 
n 
Corresponding to the representation of 3/4, for example, as 1/2 + 1/4 
+ 1/8 - 1/16 - 1/32 - ••• or as 1/2 + 1/4 - 1/8 + 1/16 + l/32 + ••• 
there are unfortunately two honest responses when p = 3/4 and two 
corresponding sequences r such that 
n 
lim r = 3/4. 
n 
For convenience 
we will assume that Prospect B is always chosen when p· = r for some 
n 
step n. This is actually no restriction because it can be shown that 
the utilities of the two honest sequences are identical in the present 
scheme. With this convention every q determines a unique sequence 
rn, and we see that at any step n the utility of the payoff based on 
the sequence r approaching any value q 
n 
is 
(4.2) f (q) 
n 
= rp + 1 - rn 
r + 1 - p 
n 
if q > r 
n 
if q < r 
- n 
{Prospect A chosen) 
{Prospect B chosen). 
Thus if the random variable N has distribution P(N = n) =TT, then 
n 
the utility as a function of p and q is given by 
(4. 3) Ep{fiq)) = 'E (p+l-r )TT + 'E (r +1-p )TT 
q>r n n q~r n n 
n n 
= a(q) + p~(q) + 1 
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where 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
a(q) =-~rTT+~rTT 
>r nn g nn q n q n 
The procedure is proper if for each fixed. p, the maximum of (4.3) occurs 
at q = p. 
then 
(4.6) 
and 
(4.7) 
It can be shown that if r =·2-8k for some odd integer k, 
s 
a(r -) - a(r +) = r (a(r +) - ~(r -)) 
s s s s ' s 
a(r +) - a(r -) = 2[TT -
s s s 
00 
~ 1Tj]. 
j=s+l 
These are the only points of increase' or decrease of a and a, 
and (4.6) implies that when q = p, (4.3) is a continuous function 
H(p) = Ep(fN(p)). If (4.7) is nonnegative, then H(p) is convex. Thus 
by the argument of Section 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the procedure to be proper is 
(4.8) 
00 
TT > ~ 1T 
s - j=s+l j for s = 1, 2, •••• 
If also all TTj > O, then the procedures is strictly proper. These 
conditions hold for example if N is the ~umber of the Bernoulli trial 
on which the first success S occurs where P(S) ~ 1/2. 
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APPENDIX 
For h given by (3.7) define 
(A.1) q(j, k) = h{2jk-1)/h(k). 
The inequalities (3.14) with k = 1 will imply (3.14) for k = 3,5,7, ••• , 
provided 
(A.2) q(j, k) decreases as k = l,3,5, ••• , increases for each j. 
For j = 1,2, ••• , and k = 1,2, ••• , we define 
(A.3) f(j, k) 
2j j 
= rr 2 k + 2s - 2 • 
s=l 2jk + 2s - 1 
It is straightforward to verify that 
(A.4) f(j+l, k) = f(j, 2k)f(J, 2k+2) j = 1,2, ••. , k = 1,2, ••• 
and 
(A.5) f(j, k) k + 1 q j, k+2 
= k + 2 q j, k j = 1,2, ••• , k = 1,3,5, •••• 
We will now show that 
(A.6) f(j, k) < (k+l)/(k+2) j = 1,2, ••• , k = 1,2, ••• , 
which by (A.5) implies (A.2). 
For j = 1, (A.6) follows from 
(A.7) k + 2 f(l, k) = 4tc2 + 8k < 1. 
k + 1 4k2 + 8k + 3 
Using (A.4) and induction on j, (A.6) follows from 
= 4k2 + 8k + 3 < 1. 
4k2 + 8k + 4 
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